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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
THIS STUDY has primarily investigated the effects of changes in
depreciation provisions on modernization expenditures in the
textile industry. In addition, attention has been given to the
effects within the industry of the 1962 introduction of the in-
vestment tax credit. The investigation relied principally on inter-
views with executives of twenty-five textile firms, conducted
during the spring and summer of 1963, although it also included
additional data provided by most of these firms and gleaned
from published financial reports.
The textile industry was selected for examination because it
was permitted to radically shorten the tax life of its basic equip-
ment before other industries were authorized to do so under the
general depreciation reform embodied in IRS Revenue Procedure
62-21 of July 1962. We were able, therefore, to observe the re-
sponse to shortened depreciation lives over a somewhat longer
period than would have been possible in other industries. In ad-
dition, the textile industry had the reputation of being in need
of modernizing, while at the same time facing abundant oppor-
tunities for implementing technological advances.
The findings of the study fall under three general headings:
(1) The experience of the industry with the depreciation pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the special tax
provisions of October 1961, and the IRS Revenue Procedure 62-
21 of July 1962. (2) The influence of liberalized depreciation on
modernization expenditures. (3) The influence of the investment
credit on modernization expenditures.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 101
DEPRECIATION EXPERIENCE SINCE 1954
A large majority of firms interviewed were prompt to adopt the
accelerated depreciation permitted by the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954. The 1961 liberalizing provisions were adopted immedi-
ately by all firms, but the impact varied widely, since some firms
were already using service lives about as short as those permitted
by the new legislation while others were not. In general, the leg-
islation seems to have lessened the inequality in effective service
lives.
Firms favored what they considered to be a "realistic" attitude
toward the new depreciation legislation. At the time of interview,
only a minority of firms had adopted the composite depreciation
accounts called for under Revenue Procedure 62-21. The majority
preferred to retain their previous item depreciation accounts,
which made it possible for them to retain proof of service life
performance in dealing with tax agents. Moreover, the firms
strongly preferred using the same depreciation accounts for tax
and financial accounting and, generally, were unwilling to make
future use of service lives shorter than those justified by opera-
tional experience.
INFLUENCE OF LIBERALIZED DEPRECIATION
ON MODERNIZATION EXPENDITURES
Liberalized depreciation may contribute to capital modernization
in two principal ways: First, it may stimulate the demand for
new capital equipment by its effect on computed rates of return
and pay-back periods, its effect on risk, and its effect on the
length of the replacement cycle. This type of influence is desig-
nated the demand effect. Second, by reducing corporate income
taxes and increasing the internal cash flow of the corporation in
the years immediately following any capital expenditure, liberal-
ized depreciation provides additional internal funds. If these
funds are considered less costly than funds procured in the cap-
ital market, they may effect an increase in modernization expen-102 TAX CHANGES IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
ditures. A possible third way for liberalized depreciation to
influence modernization expenditures is by altering the rules of
thumb that management uses in allocating capital funds to mod-
ernization or by reducing management's unwillingness to replace
equipment, a result of the more rapid reduction of the undepre-
ciated book value of assets. This last avenue of influence involves
logically incorrect approaches to the investment but requires in-
vestigation nevertheless.
In dealing with the demand effect several questions were asked:
What factors are taken into account in arriving at the decision
•to modernize? What investment formulas are used? Is there evi-
dence that the effect of tax savings on return or pay-back is
recognized even when using pretax investment formulas? Has
liberalized depreciation served to alter the decision to modernize
by purchasing new equipment rather than by modifying the old?
Every firn-i in the sample computed savings in variable unit
costs as the principal basis for judging the desirability of mod-
ernization proposals. This finding serves to establish in manage-
ment a continuing, aggressive, cost-profit orientation toward the
investment decision-making process. While depreciation liberali-
zation is not directly relevant to direct cost savings, the ultimate
impact of it will appear in the after-tax earnings. Given strong
motivation to increase after-tax earnings, sooner or later the fa-
vorable effect of depreciation will probably be taken into ac-
count.
It was not possible to judge the weight of factors which act
to alter the real cost of capital to the firm. Possible obsolescence
due to technological change was generally greater than in earlier
years but there was no evidence that it has been so great as to
impose serious limitation on the total volume of acceptable pro-
jects. Firms handle the uncertainty due to change without explicit
costing, postponing projects in which technology gives evidence
of being in a state of flux or giving such projects lower priority.
Moreover, no effort is made explicitly to estimate the effect on
overhead costs of uncertainty as to probable rate of utilization.
On the other hand, the industry's history of cyclical instabilitySUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 103
of investment expenditures indicates that over-all prospects re-
garding prices and profits are important in determining the total
amount of the capital expenditure budget.
Thus, while the adverse effects of uncertainty as to obsoles-
cence and rate of utilization may not be explicitly measured in
the investment decision, they are taken into account at least in-
formally. The effect of depreciation liberalization on taxes in the
years immediately following expenditure tends to offset these in-
hibiting considerations.
All of the interviewed firms used more or less formal rules for
evaluating investment proposals. Thirty-six per cent of the firms
interviewed used investment computation formulas which made
explicit part, if not all, of the tax savings of liberalized deprecia-
tion and thereby made management aware of an increased incen-
tive for modernizing. Moreover, more than half of this group was
comprised of large firms, so that, in terms of volume of expendi-
ture, it is a very important segment of the sample.
The remaining 64 per cent of firms made use of pretax pay-
back formulas which did not make explicit the tax savings re-
sulting from liberalized depreciation. There was little evidence
that, at time of interview, these firms were recognizing informally
(i.e., outside of the formal investment computations) that lib-
eralized depreciation resulted in reduction in the after-tax pay-
back period or in an increase in the effective rate of return. Here
again, the heavy emphasis in these firms upon analysis of ex-
plicit variable-cost savings indicates a degree of rationality which
should bring about an early realization of these advantages.
Finally, in some firms, particularly those using after-tax pay-
back or rate-of-return formulas, depreciation liberalization has
acted to encourage modernization by purchasing new facilities
rather than by modifying existing ones.
The cash flow effect influenced firms to widely differing de-
grees. Twelve firms, about half of the sample, indicated in their
debt policy and in the degree of constraint imposed by availabil-
ity of internally generated funds that the cash flow effect of lib-
eralized depreciation was significant. Most of these firms were104 TAX CHANGES IN THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
either small or medium size, hence their portion of the sample
of firms interviewed somewhat overstates the relative importance
of the cash flow influence.
When examined together, the demand and cash flow effects
showed relatively little overlapping—firms influenced in one way
were usually not influenced in the other. Nineteen of the inter-
viewed firms, roughly three-fourths of the sample, appeared to
experience either the demand or cash flow effect from liberalized
depreciation.
Regarding the third type of influence which could be exerted
by liberalized depreciation, the findings were less definite. More
than half of the firms interviewed testified that, to some degree,
the amount of depreciation charges provided a basis for guidance
in determining the size of the modernization budget. A minority,
six firms, volunteered that the amount of accumulated deprecia-
tion on the books was a consideration in replacing a given asset,
therefore, liberalized depreciation acted to increase moderniza-
tion by causing equipment to be "written-off" more quickly.
INFLUENCE OF THE INVESTMENT CREDIT
ON MODERNIZATION EXPENDITURES
The investment credit provision in force at time of interview pro-
vided for a tax credit equal to 7percent of the purchase price
of most capital goods but it also reduced the depreciable basis
of the facility by the amount of the credit. In this form the ef-
fect of the credit on profitability paralleled that of depreciation
liberalization.
The interviews revealed little appreciation of this fact. Most
executives regarded the credit as effectively not 7,percent
and of oniy nominal importance in the investment decision. There
were a number of factors which helped to explain the lack of
enthusiasm for the credit. These included the relatively recent
enactment of the credit and the widespread controversy regard-
ing the accounting treatment of the credit which accompanied
its enactment and which colored its early history.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 105
LESSONS FOB TAX POLICY
The evidence regarding the effect of liberalized depreciation and
the investment credit suggests certain lessons for tax policy. The
depreciation reforms of 1954 and 1961—62 appear to have resulted
in changes which executives regarded as consistent with their
concepts of "realistic" depreciation. Evidence accumulated from
the interviews indicates that further shortening of lives or ac-
celeration of depreciation might meet with less enthusiasm.
It would also seem that any tax reform which relies upon the
demand effect and a thorough-going appreciation of the discount
principle is likely to be of limited success until further educa-
tional work has been done.
To the extent that the responses derived from the sample inter-
views are representative of the American economy, two conclu-
sions seem appropriate. The tendency for executives to fail to
take account of the fact that "time is money" stands as an im-
portant deterrent to the full effectiveness of legislation (such as
the investment credit) which depends upon appreciation of the
principle for full effectiveness. Second, there seems to be a lag
in realization and learning which delays such legislation in at-
taining its full effectiveness.